Threat Researcher’s Notebook: BubbleLoader
Highlights
- ReversingLabs analyzed the latest variant of BubbleLoader, an evolving loader actively leveraged in recent attack campaigns.
- This loader could be leveraged against your organization in order to deliver secondary malicious payloads.
- BubbleLoader hijacks common benign software by patching and adding two PNGs to convert it into a delivery mechanism for malicious payloads.
- Two activity clusters in mid-September and early October indicate that BubbleLoader is actively being used by adversaries.
- BubbleLoader leverages anti-forensics techniques like runtime polymorphism to ensure that the in-memory image hash of its payload changes for every execution.
- ReversingLabs recommends strict allowlisting and code-signing verification, among other security controls described in the Recommendations section of this analysis, in order to best defend your organization against this threat.
Executive Summary
Recent activity clusters reveal updated variants of BubbleLoader, a loader/packer designed to hijack benign software. By patching and adding two PNGs to otherwise legitimate software, BubbleLoader is able to convert any executable to a malicious payload delivery mechanism. It targets common software as its host such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, and virtiofs. The patch is a series of instructions that are applied at the exact address of the host PE’s entry point. The entry point patch has had a number of variants as it evolved over time, but the features analysis provided below is based on the most recent variant available at the time this report was written. Early examples of BubbleLoader first appeared in February 2026. ReversingLabs observed two recent, distinctive activity clusters in mid-September and early October. In general, there are four stages. The entry point patch allocates memory and copies the PNGs into that location. The second, fake PNG houses both a small area of second-stage shellcode and the XOR-encrypted third stage. Once executed, this shellcode uses the first PNG as a rolling XOR key to decrypt the third stage. The third stage decrypts the final payload PE and then performs a reflective loading process that includes a set of anti-analysis features. The final payload is variable depending on the malware family being distributed in a particular sample. The following is a detailed breakdown of these steps, followed by recommendations tailored to combating Bubbleloader’s features.