Android banking Trojan targets more than 232 apps including Indian Banks

Credit to Author: Bajrang Mane| Date: Wed, 03 Jan 2018 07:27:59 +0000

Quick Heal Security Labs detected an Android Banking Trojan that targets more than 232 banking apps including Indian banks. The malware is known as Android.banker.A9480. Like most other Android banking malware, even this one is designed for stealing login credentials, hijacking SMSs, uploading contact lists and SMSs on a malicious server, displaying an overlay screen (to capture details) on top of legitimate apps and carrying out other such malicious activities. Infection vector Android.banker.A9480 is being distributed through a fake Flash Player app on third-party stores. This is not surprising given that Adobe Flash is one of the most widely distributed products on the Internet. Because of its popularity and global install base, it is often targeted by attackers. Technical analysis After installing the malicious app, it will ask the user to activate administrative rights. And even if the user denies the request or kill the process, the app will keep throwing continuous pop-ups until the user activates the admin privilege. Once this is done, the malicious app hides its icon soon after the user taps on it.   Fig 1: Requesting to grant device administrator rights   Fig 2: Code to hide the app icon In the background, the app carries out malicious tasks – it keeps checking the installed app on the victim’s device and particularly looks for 232 apps (banking and some cryptocurrency apps). If any one of the targeted apps is found on the infected device, the app shows a fake notification on behalf of the targeted banking app. If the user clicks on the notification, they are shown a fake login screen to steal the user’s confidential info like net banking login ID and password. During our analysis, we found that the malware was capable of receiving and processing the following commands from the C&C server: In the background, the app carries out malicious tasks – it keeps checking the installed app on the victim’s device and particularly looks for 232 apps (banking and some cryptocurrency apps). If any one of the targeted apps is found on the infected device, the app shows a fake notification on behalf of the targeted banking app. If the user clicks on the notification, they are shown a fake login screen to steal the user’s confidential info like net banking login ID and password. During our analysis, we found that the malware was capable of receiving and processing the following commands from the C&C server: Send_GO_SMS Send an SMS GetSWSGO Collect all SMS from the device nymBePsG0 Upload list of contacts to a malicious server telbookgotext Send SMS to all contacts with the text from its command StartAutoPush Show fake notification RequestPermissionInj ACCESSIBILITY Permission RequestPermissionGPS GPS Permission killBot Set all urls null in Shared Preferences getIP Upload location to a malicious server ussd Send a USSD request 1. Whenever the client receives the command “startAutoPush” from the server, it shows a fake notification with the targeted app’s icon (title: “Urgent message!” & text: “Confirm your account”). Clicking on the notification takes the user to a fake login page as discussed earlier.   Fig 3: Code to check the server command During the time of our analysis, the C&C server was not functional; so, we were unable to monitor the dynamic activity of the app. Fig 4: Code to load the phishing page 2. The malware can intercept all incoming and outgoing SMS from the infected device. This enables the attackers to bypass SMS-based two-factor authentication on the victim’s bank account (OTP). The malware was also able to send SMSs with a dynamically received text and number from the server side. 3. Whenever the client receives the command “GetSWSGO” from the server, it collects all SMSs stored on the device and uploads them to the malicious server. Fig 5: Code to upload SMS to server 4. The malware can also set the device’s ringer volume to silent in order to suppress SMS notifications: Fig 6: Code to put the device on silent 5. Whenever the client receives a command “nymBePsG0” from the server, it uploads the victim’s contacts to the malicious server. Fig 7: Code to upload contact to malicious server Targeted banking apps in India The following is a list…
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